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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Third

Party

Defendant

("Respondent Calder"),

and

Respondent

by and through

Glen

H.

Calder

its counsel

of

record,

hereby submits this Brief.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3), (1953, as amended).

Respondent Calder brought a Motion for Summary Judgment
before the lower court, seeking to have the Third Party Complaint
filed by the Third Party Plaintiffs and Appellants ("Appellants")
dismissed, based on the running of the statute of limitations. (R.
74).

Seventh District Court Judge Dennis Draney, following the

filing of a Motion for Reconsideration by Respondent Calder,
dismissed the Third Party Complaint. (R. 129, 130).

The court

ruling, dated June 17, 1987, provided that: the cause of action in
the instant matter was for negligence, Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-12-25(2) (1053, as amended) governs negligence actions,
the last action necessary to complete the cause of action occurred
in May, 1972, when Respondent Calder signed the survey and the
discovery requirement of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-26(3)
does not apply to a cause of action in negligence. (R. 129, 130).
(A copy of the ruling is in the Addendum.)
The original action filed in this matter was tried before the
court on June 23, 1987.

(R. 166, 167). The Plaintiffs prevailed

pursuant to the Ruling of the Judge signed June 24, 19, which
Ruling was filed with the court on July 6, 1987.

(R. 146, 147).

A Judgment, provided pursuant to Rules of Practice, Rule 2.9, was
filed with the court on August (R. 154). Appellant filed a Motion
for New Trial with the court on August 13, 1987. (R. 173).

The

Order denying Appellants1 Motion for New Trial was filed with the
court on December 3, 1987 and Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal
on December 28, 1987.

(R. 200-203).

2

Appellants

apparently

reached

a settlement

agreement with

Plaintiffs, and the only issues to be reviewed by this Court are
those issues related to the lower court's dismissal of Appellants'
Third Party Complaint.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether the claim of Appellants, brought fourteen years after
Calder signed the survey relating to Appellant's land and which
constituted the last act necessary to complete the alleged cause
of action in negligence against Respondent Calder, is barred by
the statute of limitations.
CONTROLLING STATUTE
The

controlling

statute

in

this

matter

is

Utah

Code

Annotated, Section 78-12-25(2) (1953, as amended), which provides
that actions for relief not otherwise provided for by law should
be brought within four years.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In

1971, Appellants

Strawberry

River Estates

purchased
located

30

acres

of

property

from

in Duchesne County, Utah. (T.

393, 394). Appellants later purchased an additional 10 acres from
Strawberry River Estates. (T. 395-397).

Appellants then contacted

and hired the firm of Wilson & Calder to survey the property. (T.
399-400).

Wilson

& Calder

surveyed

the property

and

provided

Appellants with a Certificate of Survey related to the property.
(R. 413, 414).

This Certificate of Survey was signed by Glen

Calder, on behalf of Wilson & Calder, on May 15, 1972. (R. 5, 140)

3

(A copy of the Certificate of Survey is in the Addendum to this
Brief.)
Appellants sold the property to the Plaintiffs in this action
in July, 1983.

(T. 327).

Sometime in February, 1985, the

Plaintiffs discovered there was a problemi with the boundaries of
the subject property.

(T.432-433).

Plaintiffs commenced this

action against Appellants, in the end, alleging mutual mistake and
seeking rescission of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. (R. 135140).

As previously stated, Appellants filed a Third Party

Complaint alleging negligence in the preparation of the survey of
the subject property and it is the dismissal of said action which
is the subject of this appeal.

(R. 15-19).

SUMMARY OF RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT
The trial

court's decision to dismiss the Third

Party

Complaint based on the running of the statute of limitations
relating to negligence should be upheld by this Court.

The

alleged cause of action was for negligence, and the statute of
limitations for negligence requires that such actions be brought
within

four years.

Appellants

contention

that Utah

Code

Annotated, Section 78-12-26(3) relating to actions based on fraud
or mistake is the "Determinative Statute" is in error.
Next, the lower court's determination that the last act
necessary to complete the alleged cause of action was Calder?s
signing of the Certificate of Survey in May, 1972, was correct and
therefore, as Appellants1

Third Party Complaint was not filed

4

until May 1986, the action was not timely filed and is barred by
the statute of limitations governing negligence actions.
The Discovery

Rule

should

not be

applied

in the

instant

matter as "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action
does not prevent

the

running

of

the

statute

of limitations."

Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah, 1981).
instant

action

does

not

fall

within

the

Further, the

exceptions

to

the

Judgement

was

Discovery Rule.
Dismissal
appropriate.

of

this

action

through

Summary

In the alternative, Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-

12-25(1), Section 78-12-25.5 or Section 78-12-26(1) may apply to
the case at bar and application of any of these sections would
also bar Appellants' claim.
ARGUMENT
Point I.

The Lower Court Correctly Determined that the Instant
Action be Governed by the Four Year Statute of
Limitation related to Negligence, Pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-12-25(2).

The lower court, in its Ruling, stated:
Based upon the pleadings and memoranda of Third Party
Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the cause of action is one
for negligence. As such it must have been commenced within
four (4) years as set forth in Section 78-12-25 (2) UCA.
That Utah Code Annotated
section

for a negligence

long-standing Utah law.
235,

236

(1875);

§ 78-12-25(2) is the

action such

as this

appropriate

is well-settled,

Thomas v. Union Pacific R.R.Co., 1 Utah

Albretson v. Judd, 709 P.2d

347

(Utah

1985);

Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980); Hansen v. Petrof
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Trading Co,, 527 P.2d 116 (Utah 1974); Peteler v. Robison, 17 P.2d
244 (Utah 1932).
Notwithstanding

the

above, Appellants

cite Utah

Code

Annotated, Section 78-12-26(3) as the Determinative Statute and
request this Court to rule that said section governs the instant
matter,

(Appellants Brief at P.l and 10).

Utah Code Annotated,

Section 78-12-26(3) provides that actions for relief on the
grounds of fraud or mistake should be brought within three years,
with the proviso that the cause of action in such case does not
accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3) for fraud or mistake is
inapplicable to the case at bar.

Appellants may not contort and

align their negligence cause of action to sound in fraud or
mistake to avoid the applicable statute of limitations.

"Neither

the form of the proceeding nor the name applied to it can change
the nature of the wrong or the injury . . . the statute fixes the
time within which such an action must be brought. . . . "

Reese v.

Qualtrouqh, 156 P. 955, 959 (Utah 1916).
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-26(3) is inapplicable in
that Respondent Calder did not mislead or induce Appellants to
refrain from bringing suit within the statutory period.

There are

no facts indicating fraud, mistake, concealment or misleading
actions by Respondent

Calder which would activate Utah Code

Annotated Section 78-12-26(3).

"Nothing is reflected to indicate

6

low blows, hidden microphones, smokefilled rooms or deception."
Smoot v. Hydro Flame Corporation, 522 P. 2d 709, 710 (Utah 1974).
Generally mistake statutes are applied in actions to reform
deeds and other written instruments.
Actions § 92, 198.
where Utah

54 C.J.S.

Limitations of

Utah law follows this rule.

In those cases

Code Annotated

§ 78-12-26(3) was cited

for the

principle of mistake, it was in a fact situation dealing with the
reformation of a deed or other similar written instrument.

Haslem

v. Ottosen, 689 P.2d 27 (Utah 1984); Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d
974 (Utah 1982); Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180 (Utah 1975); McKellar
v. McKellar, 458 P.2d 867 (Utah 1969); Doxey v.

Layton, 548 P.2d

902 (Utah 1976); McKonkie v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974).
There was no deed or written instrument between the parties of
this cause of action to reform through application of the mistake
doctrine.

No Utah case applies the mistake statute of limitations

to a negligence action as the case at bar.
Negligence

is not the equivalent of mistake.

"assumes to know."
1946).

Mistake

Fitzgerald v. Morgan, 38 S.E.2d 171, 173 (Ga.

"It [mistake] is distinguished from . . that inattention

or absence of thought which are inherent in negligence .
mistake has nothing in common with negligence. . . . "

Callan

Court Co. v. Citizens & Southern Natf 1 Bank, 190 S.E. 831, 854
(Ga.

1937).

Mistake is a misunderstanding of the truth but

without negligence.

Id.

Negligence results from carelessness.

Matheson v. Pearson, supra.
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Moreover, the case at bar is not pled as an action for fraud
and therefore, once more, fails to fall within the ambit of Utah
Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3).
be

inapplicable.

Even were fraud alleged, it would

Negligence

is distinguished

from

"fraud,

fraudulent representations, or fraudulent concealments, by the
absence of knowledge and intention, which in legal fraud are
actually present, and in constructive fraud are theoretically
present, as necessary elements."

Callan, 190 S.E. at 854.

Fraud or mistake as applied in Utah Code Annotated § 78-1226(3) is inapplicable

to the current action.

The basis of

Appellants' claim in their Third Party Complaint is the alleged
"negligence and failure of Third Party Defendants' to properly
survey and locate the subject property."

(R. 17, Para. 7 ) . Utah

courts have always ruled that the applicable statute governing
negligence claims is Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25(2) (1953, as
amended).

This Court should uphold the lower court's decision

that said section governing negligence actions applies to the case
at bar.
Point II. This Court Should Uphold the Lower Court's
that the Last Act Necessary to Complete
Action was Calder's Signing of The Survey
and Likewise Rule that Appellants' Claim
the Statute of Limitations.

Determination
the Cause of
in May, 1972
is Barred by

A cause of action accrues upon the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action,

Becton Dickinson and Co. v. Reese,

668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983).

According to the ruling of the

lower court, the last action necessary to complete the cause of
action was Calder's signing of the survey which action occurred in
8

May of 1972. (R. 129).

As the instant action was not commenced

until May, 1986, nearly fourteen years after the

"last event,"

Appellants' claim is barred by Section 78-12-25(2).
In Lembert v. Gilbert, 312 A.2d 335, 337 (Del.Ch. 1973), an
action

was

discovered

brought
the

against

survey was

a

surveyor

inaccurate.

when

the

plaintiff

The defendant

surveyor

moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that it was not timely
filed

pursuant

to the applicable

statute of

limitations.

issue before the court was when did the statute of
begin

to run.

In this regard,

The

limitations

the court concluded

that

"the

injury caused by the defendant occurred at the time of placing of
the surveyor's stakes in 1965 and that the statute of limitations
commenced to run at that time." Lembert at 337.

In making said

determination, the court had relied on the general rule that "the
statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the injury
caused by defendant rather than from the date on which plaintiffs
became aware or discovered the injury." Id.
While the exact issue raised in the instant matter has not
been reviewed by Utah courts, similar issues can provide guidance.
In Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Construction, 764 P.2d 1370
(Utah, 1987), Utah's Supreme Court was asked to determine when the
cause

of

action

in

a construction

contract

case

arose.

The

general rule in such cases is that an "owner's claim of defective
construction against a general contractor is generally considered
to

accrue

on the date the construction

Young at 1373.

is completed."

This rule was adopted by this Court.
9

Brigham
Likewise

this Court should rule that an owner's claim against a surveyor is
considered to accrue on the date the survey is complete.
In the instant case, the survey was performed in 1972.

It is

not disputed that Respondent Calder signed the Certificate of
Survey in May, 1972.
survey.

Such act was the last act related to the

The Certificate

of

Survey was referenced

in the

complaints filed by the Plaintiffs as well as the Appellants and
as such is part of the pleadings on file.

(R. 5).

As the statute of limitations commenced to run at that time
the Certificate of Survey was signed, Appellants' action brought
fourteen years after "accrual," is barred by the four year statute
of limitation for negligence actions.
78-12-25(2).

Utah Code Annotated Section

Such a result is also supported by the governing

policy in this area of the law:

"[statutes of limitations] are

designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence
has

been

lost,

disappeared."

memories

have

faded,

and

Order of Railroad Telegraphers v.

Agency. Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49

(1944).

witnesses

have

Railway Express
The lower court

appropriately dismissed Appellants' Third Party Complaint because
it was not timely filed and that determination should be upheld by
this Court.
Point III:

The Discovery Rule Does Not Apply as There are No
Exceptional Circumstances in the Instant Matter to
Warrant the Use of the Discovery Rule.

Appellants could have brought an action

for negligence

against Respondent Calder in 1972, thus, the cause of action
10

accrued at that time.

While Appellants argue that the cause of

action did not arise until discovery of the alleged negligence,
"Mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not
prevent the running of the statute of limitations.

Myers at 86.

Appellants cite three cases in support of their contention
that the "discovery rule" should apply to the instant matter.
The first case cited by Appellant, Becton Dickinson & Co. v.
Reese, 668 P. 2d 1254 (Utah, 1983), does not support Appellants1
contention.

Appellants are misleading the court in arguing that

the discovery rule "has been extended to cases in conversion in
Becton."

After reviewing the various exceptions to the discovery

rule, Utahfs Supreme Court stated, "None of those exceptions is
applicable to the instant case." Becton at 1257.

The discovery

rule was not applied in Becton.
The exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the use of the
discovery rule, as set forth in Becton, are threefold.

First, in

some areas of the law, the discovery rule is incorporated into the
statute, whereby the statute does not begin to run until the facts
forming the basis of the cause of action are discovered.

Second,

concealment or misleading acts by a party prevents that party from
relying on the statue of limitations.

Finally where there are

"exceptional circumstances that would make application of the
general rule irrational or unjust, this Court has adopted the
discovery rule by judicial action." Becton at 1257.
It is obvious that the first two exceptions do not apply to
the instant case.

It is Respondent Calder?s position that the
11

third exception, that of exceptional circumstances, does not apply
to the instant case either.

Appellants never set forth any

evidence alleging said "exceptional circumstances."
This Court found that exceptional circumstances existed in
the case of Myers v. McDonald,

supra.

distinguishable from the instant case.

However, Myers is

In Myers a wrongful death

action was brought approximately one year after the statute of
limitation had lapsed.

The guardians of the deceased made several

attempts to determine the whereabouts of the deceased but were
unable

to locate him.

concerning

They even read

the death of

a mysterious

a newspaper
automobile

article

passenger

described as being brown haired, 5 feet 8 inches tall, and in his
early twenties.

The deceased was actually blonde, 6 feet 2 inches

tall and fourteen years of age.

The deceased was eventually

discovered in the morgue through a routine follow-up procedure by
the police.
The

Court

stated

that

the

"exceptional"

or

"unique

circumstances" of the case permitted application of the "discovery
rule." Id at 86, 87.

That is, the facts necessary to pursue the

cause of action were simply not discoverable within the applicable
time frame because there was no knowledge of a death.

Id.

The

Court held that if the guardians were unable to prove "due
diligence" in their attempts to discover the facts, then the
statute of limitations would be applicable.

Id at 87.

In the instant case, all the facts necessary to pursue the
cause of action were available and easily ascertainable in 1972.
12

Respondent Calder did not hide or otherwise conceal his acts.

The

land was available for anyone at anytime to observe and if they
desired, the Plaintiffs in this action or Appellants could have
performed another survey.

In those cases where the "discovery"

rule has been accepted, it is usually due to the ability of the
offending party to conceal from the potential plaintiff facts
which are crucial to the cause of action.
situation in the case at bar.

Such is not the

Respondent Calder has never been in

a position to mislead or to conceal facts.
In addition, the instant action was brought fourteen years
after the accrual of the cause of action rather than three years
as in Myers, and, pursuant to Section 78-12-25(2), Appellants had
four years to bring their action rather than two years as in
Myers.

The four year statute of limitation provided Appellants a

reasonable time in which to discover any negligent acts and is
applicable where Appellants had reasonable means for knowing or
obtaining knowledge of the existence of a cause of action through
the exercise of vigilance in the means within their reach.
Appellants1 reliance upon Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d 435
(Utah, 1968) is also misplaced.

The discovery rule was extended

to medical malpractice in this Christiansen case.

However, a

medical malpractice case is easily distinguished from the present
case.

It appears the plaintiff in Hooper Water Improvement v.

Reeve, 642 P. 2d 745 (Utah, 1982) had made a similar argument to
the one Appellants raise; however the court in Hooper stated:
The plaintiff's case on appeal is based on false syllogistic
reasoning, since its theme appears to be that because a
13

doctor is a professional man and can be sued for negligence,
and a consulting engineer is a professional man and likewise
can be sued for negligence, the fact that the first can be
sued when the plaintiff discovers a sponge was left in his
stomach, the latter can be sued when it is discovered sand
was left in his well.
Hooper at 746.
This Court in Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah, 1974)
responded to such an argument with, "The confidential relationship
between

doctor

contractors

and patient

is different

and home owners."

from that between

Good at 225.

Likewise, the

relationship between a land owner and surveyor is substantially
different from the confidential relationship between doctor and
patient.

The medical malpractice facts of the Christiansen case

distinguish it from the present case.
Appellants

next

argue

that parallel with the

judicial

expansion in 1968 in Christiansen and again in 1981 in Myers of
the discovery rule, there has also been a legislative expansion.
Respondent Calder first notes that there has not been a recent
judicial

expansion

because

this Court has not invoked

the

discovery rule in the most recent cases before it: Hooper Water
Improvement District v. Reeve in 1982, Becton v. Reese in 1983 and
Brigham Young University v. Paulsen in 1987.
In Hooper Water Improvement District v. Reeve, this Court
held

that

the

statute of limitations

(applying

78-12-25.5)

precluded a negligence action against an engineer for negligently
supervising

the construction of a well where the action was

brought eleven years after construction of the well was completed.
This Court again refused to apply the discovery rule.
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In Becton v. Reese, the patent in question was issued five
years

before the defendant had

filed his counterclaim

and the

statute governing said matters bars any action brought more than
three years after the cause of action has accrued.

This Court, as

stated previously, found that none of the exceptions regarding the
discovery rule applied.
In Brigham Young v. Paulsen, the court applied the six year
statute of limitations governing written contracts and found that
the causes of action against the two contractors accrued at the
completion of their respective construction contracts.

Further,

the Court found that the discovery rule did not apply as, "We find
nothing in the present case that warrants use of the discovery
rule."

Brigham Young at 1374.

Respondent Calder next notes that the legislative expansion
has certainly not been recent.

The statutes cited by Appellants,

Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-12-19, 78-12-26(1-3), and 78-1227 have been a part of the Utah Code since 1951.

Further, in some

instances, the Legislature has even fixed a maximum period for
exposure

to

litigation

legislatively adopted.

where

the

discovery

rule

has

been

For example, under the medical malpractice

statute of limitations, the cause of action must be brought within
two years after the plaintiff discovers, or should discover, his
injury but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged
act, omission, neglect or occurrence.
78-14-4(1) (1979).
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See Utah Code Annotated §

The discovery rule is only extended in cases where there is a
legislative enactment, concealment or fraud on the part of the
defendant,

or

exceptional

circumstances.

Failing

these

exceptions, the discovery rule is not utilized.
Notably, Appellants never even alleged any facts to support
an argument for an exception to the discovery rule in the case at
bar.

Again, the discovery rule is inapplicable to the instant

case.

The lower court's determination that the discovery rule

does not apply should be upheld.
Point IV: Summary Judgment was Properly Utilized in this Case.
Appellants contend that Summary Judgment was improper in the
instant matter as there were "material issues of fact remaining
involving

the

question

of

1) the

appropriate

statute

of

limitations to apply, 2) the applicability of the discovery rule."
(Appellants Brief at p. 7).

Both alleged matters of "material

issues of fact" are, in actuality, issues of law and properly
determined in summary proceedings.
Appellants also argue that "It was Respondent's burden to
produce evidence

and it failed to do so.

produce [sic] plenty of law, but no facts."
7).

Resopndent

[sic]

(Appellants1 Brief at

Appellants state that "the only references to the survey, its

conclusions, and the date of the signing of the certificate were
based upon memoranda alone."

(Appellants1 Brief at 7). However,

as stated previously, the Certificate of Survey was referenced in
the Complaints of Plaintiffs and Appellants and was included in
the pleadings. (R. 5, 140).

There was no dispute regarding the
16

signing

of

the

Certificate.

Certificate

Where

of

pleadings

Survey

and

or

answers

the
to

date

on

the

interrogatories

disclose undisputed facts which permit resolution of a controversy
as a matter of law, it is appropriate to enter Summary Judgment.
Aird Insurance Agency v. Zions First National Bank, 612 P.2d 341
(Utah, 1980).
It

also

appears

from

Appellants'

Brief

that

Appellants

contend that if a party argues that the discovery rule should be
applied, such a determination can only be made at a trial and
cannot be determined through Summary Judgment.
case

history

applicability
Summary

establishes

of the discovery

Judgment.

an appeal

a

determination

from

as

to

rule may be dealt with

Both Becton and Hooper

were Summary Judgment cases.
was

that

However, actual

Improvement

the

through
District

The Brigham Young University case

a judgment on the pleadings.

It appears,

although it is not clear, that the appeal in Good v. Christensen
was

from

a

Rule

Plaintiff Good.

12(b) motion,

dismissing

the

complaint

of

It is obvious from these cases that arguing the

applicability of the discovery rule does not prohibit the use of
Summary Judgment or any remedy similar to Summary Judgment.
Finally, Appellants never presented any facts to the lower
court with respect to why Appellants fell within the exceptions
relating to the discovery rule, nor do they present any arguments
to this Court as to why the exceptions apply to the case at bar.
Point V:

In the Alternative, Should this Court Find that Section
78-12-25(2) does not Govern the Instant Matter, Sections
17

78-12-25(1), 78-12-25.5 or 78-12-26(1) Would
Bar Appellantsf Cause of Action.

Likewise

The lower court dismissed Appellants1 Third Party Complaint
pursuant to Section 78-12-25(2) as it had been filed after the
statute of

limitations had run.

As this Court is required to

"affirm a trial court's decision whenever we can do so as a proper
ground, even though it was not the ground on which the trial court
relied in its ruling," Respondent Calder presents the following
argument to this Court.

Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley

Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah, 1984).
The issue of which statute governs in the instant action was
raised in the lower court on numerous occasions.

In Respondent

Calderfs

Supplemental

Supplemental

Memorandum

in

support

Memorandum
of

his

and

Motion

Second
for

Summary

Judgment,

Respondent Calder argued, in the alternative, the applicability of
several statutes to the instant matter. (R. 101 and 122).
The

first

alternative

argued by Respondent

Calder

is Utah

Code Annotated, Section 78-12-25.5 related to damages arising from
the

defective

applied

in

complaint

improvement

the

Hooper

alleged

to real property.

Improvement

negligence

on

the

District
part

of

This

statute

was

case

wherein

the

the defendant, a

consulting engineer, in supervising the construction of a water
well, pursuant to a contract.

Section 78-12-25.5 bars all claims

filed more than seven years after the completion of construction.
Should
matter,

this

statute

Appellants'

be

found

Third

to be applicable

Party
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Complaint

to the

would

be

instant

still

be

dismissed as this action was filed fourteen years after the survey
was completed.
Next, based on the pleadings, there was no written contract
between Appellants and Respondent Calder. (R. 68).

Assuming the

existence of an oral contract between Appellants and Respondent
Calder, an alternative applicable statute of limitations is Utah
Code Annotated, Section 78-12-25(1).

According to Footnote 1 of

the Brigham Young University case, a cause of action in negligence
which arises from one's contractual duties adds nothing to one's
cause of action and certainly does not serve to convert the case
into a tort action.

"A negligent failure to perform contractual

duties

of

is

a breach

contract,

University, at 1372, Footnote 1.

not

a tort." Brigham

Young

And, just as an owner's claim

for negligent construction accrues on the date the construction is
complete, a owner's claim for the alleged negligence to properly
survey and locate the subject property accrues on the date the
survey is complete.

Therefore, should Section 78-12-25(1), which

requires actions based on oral contracts to be brought within four
years after accrual, apply to the instant case, Appellants' cause
of action is once again time barred pursuant to the running of the
statute of limitations.
Finally,

Utah

Code Annotated,

found to apply to the instant case.

Section

78-12-26(1) may be

Section 78-12-26(1) applies

to actions for injury to real property and said Section requires
actions to be brought within three years after they accrue.
the alleged

cause of action arose
19

As

fourteen years prior to the

filing of the action, the cause of action would have to be
dismissed against Respondent Calder for Appellants' failure to
file the action in a timely manner.
Irrespective of the statute selected, Appellants' claim is
time barred by the running of the statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION
The

cause of

action cited

Complaint is for negligence.

in Appellants' Third

Party

The lower court appropriately ruled

that actions for negligence are governed by Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-12-25(2).

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-26(3) does

not apply to this matter.
The lower court also correctly ruled that the last act
necessary to complete the alleged cause of action was Calder?s
signing of the survey in May, 1972. As the instant action was not
commenced until May, 1986, fourteen years after the "last act,"
the running of the statute of limitations barred Appellants' claim
and the Third Party Complaint was appropriately dismissed by the
lower court. Likewise, the lower court appropriately ruled that
the discovery rule did not apply to the instant matter.
Therefore, Respondent Calder respectfully requests this court
to uphold the ruling of the lower court and rule that Appellants'
Third Party Complaint was appropriately dismissed pursuant to the
running of the statute of limitations.
In the alternative, Respondent Calder requests this court to
rule that Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-25(1), Section 78-

20

12-25.5 or Section 78-12-26(1) applies to this case and bars
Appellants1 claim.

DATED this 27th day of January, 1989.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert F. Babcock
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
Attorneys for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

•? / " day of January, 1989, I

caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, four true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to Ephraim
Fankhauser, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111.

tihk /? Jthh±
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ADDENDUM

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

flLuu

ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROLD
J. KLINGER, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

< i

R U L I N G

hDlSTRlCTCOURTDUCHES
JUiU?1S:7

riOGERK.MHHfcT'1, Clerk

vs.

0>

EUGENE E . KIGHTLY, HELEN L .
KIGHTLY, e t a l . ,
Defendants.

Civil No. 86-CV-68D

The Court, having fully considered the pleadings and the
memoranda, and having now agreed to reconsider Third Party
Defendants Motion for Summar Judgment hereby enters its ruling.
Based upon the pleadings and memoranda of Third Party
Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the cause of action is one for
negligence.

As such, it must have been commenced within four (4)

years as set forth in Section 78-12-25(2) UCA.

The Court finds

that the last action necessary to complete the cause of action
was Calder's signing of the survey which action occurred in May
of 1972. This action was not commenced until May 1986. The
Court further rules that the "discovery11 requirement of Section
78-12-26(3) does not apply to a cause of action in negligence.
Therefore, the Court's previous ruling is set aside and

O.i* b

Third Party Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted
and the Third Party Complaint is dismissed.
DATED this / 7

day of June, 198 7.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

Rick J. Sutherland
E. H. Fankhauser
Robert F. Babcock
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Certificate of Survey

r

T.iS . RBft

I, Glen H. Caldor, do hereby certify that I am
a Registered Land Surveyor in the State of Utah, and
that the plat described hereon portrays a survey made
by n:.» or under my direction. I further certify that
the above plat correctly shows the true dimensions of
the property surveyed and of the improvements located
ther«ion; and further that there are no encroachments
on said property.
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